The system supports N+1 AA ISA equipment warm redundancy (N primary and 1 backup). If a backup is configured and there is no ISA available (a primary and backup failed), there will be a “no aa-isa” fault. The backup AA ISA is pre-configured with isa-aa.tim and the group policies. Datapath traffic is only sent to active AA ISAs, so the backup has no flow state. If a backup ISA is unavailable, there will be a “backup missing” fault.
Upon failure of a primary AA ISA, all of its AA subscribers and their traffic are operationally moved to the newly active backup AA ISA but the current flow states are lost (warm redundancy). The new AA ISA will identify any session-based active flows at a time of switchover as an existing protocol, while the other flows will be re-identified. The
existing protocol-based application filters can be defined to ensure service hot redundancy for a subset of applications. Once the backup AA ISA has taken control, it will wait for operator control to revert activity to the failed primary AA ISA module.
Asymmetry removal also allows a VPN site (Figure 11) to be connected with multi-homed, dual-active links while offering AAN services with the ISA.
When traffic needs to be remotely diverted it flows over shunts that are provisioned as sdp-id:vc-id between the dual-homed aa-sub local service an a remote vc-switching Ipipe.
If it is desired to rebalance the ISA load between the peer nodes, there is a tools perform application-assurance aarp aarp-id force-evaluate command will re-run AARP activity evaluation on a per-ISA basis to determine Master/Backup AARP based on configured priority.
Table 4 shows the interaction and dependencies between AARP states between a local node and its peer:
If the re-balancing of AA subscribers is required (for instance after the addition of new ISAs), there is a tools command to rebalance AA subscribers between ISAs within a group. Rebalance affects which AA subs divert to which ISAs based on capacity cost. Transit subs cannot be rebalanced independent of the parent (they move with the parent divert), and DSM subs cannot be load balanced as all subs on an ISA-AA are from the associated ISA-BB pair. The system attempts to move aa-subs from the most full ISA to the least full ISA based on the load balancing mode. If the load becomes balanced or an aa-sub move fails due to ISA resources or divert IOM service queuing resources, the load balancing terminates.
Figure 14 shows the general mechanism for filtering traffic of interest and diverting this traffic to the appropriate AA ISA module residing on an IOM (referred as the host IOM). This traffic management divert method applies to both bridged and routed configurations.
Table 5 shows spoke SDP divert capabilities.
Application Assurance adds new map (app-profile-map) application profile command to associate an app-profile-string from dynamic subscriber management to a specific application profile using its app-profile-name that has been pre-provisioned. The application profile map is configured in the
config>subscr-mgmt>sub-ident-pol context.
The example in Figure 20, shows how the use of just a single ASO can save the user from having to provision an AQP entry every time a subscriber is created.
The override commands can only be used if there is already an app-profile assigned to the aa-sub, otherwise, the overrides are rejected.
Figure 21 shows the relationship between the Application Assurance system components used to identify applications and configure Application Assurance related capabilities. Each ID-related component is defined as follows:
Table 7 provides an overview of how those various components used in Application Assurance to recognize types of flows/sessions.
Dynamic upgrades of the signatures in the system are implemented by invoking an admin application-assurance upgrade command and then performing AA ISA activity switches.
The protocol shutdown feature provides the ability for signature upgrades without automatically affecting policy behavior, especially if some or even all new signatures are not required for a service. All new signatures are disabled on upgrade by default to ensure no policy/service impact because of the signature update.
Application groups are defined as a container for multiple applications. The only application group created by default is Unknown. Any applications not assigned to a group are automatically assigned to the default
Unknown group. Application groups are expected to be defined when a common policy on a set of applications is expected, yet per each application visibility in accounting is required. The application group name is a key match criteria within application QoS policy rules.
The Application Assurance system provides no pre-defined applications other than Unknown. Applications must be explicitly configured. Any protocols not assigned to an application are automatically assigned to the default
Unknown application. Alcatel-Lucent provides sets of known-good application/app-group configurations upon request. Contact the technical support staff for further information.
Table 9 lists the statistic record fields per AA partition.
Figure 22 illustrates the different messaging /call flows involved in application level usage monitoring. For details about the supported AVPs used in these messages, see section
Supported AVPs.
AA ISA (the PCEF) supports Usage-Thresholds AVPs that refer to the thresholds (in byte) at which point an event needs to be sent back to the PCRF (
Figure 22).
AA supports grant-service-unit AVP using the following possible values (AVP):
As shown in Figure 22 (T=7), AA sends a CCR message with a USAGE_REPORT Event-Trigger AVP to the PCRF when the usage counter reaches the configured usage monitoring threshold for a given subscriber (and given application group). AA counters are reset (to zero) when the monitoring threshold is reached (and an event is sent back to PCRF). The counter(s) however does not stop counting newly arriving traffic. AA counters only include “admitted” packets. Any packets that got discarded by AA due to –say- policing actions- are not counted for usage-monitoring purposes.
Note— The AVPs marked by an asterisk in the above example are not supported by AA ISA.
Note— The AVPs marked by an asterisk in the above example are not supported by AA ISA.
Note— The AVPs marked by an asterisk in the above example are not supported by AA ISA
PCC_RULE_LEVEL (1) —This value, if provided within an RAR or CCA command by the PCRF, indicates that the usage monitoring instance applies to one or more PCC rules. This is used in 3GPP Release 12 by the AA Usage Monitoring feature.
Note— If no monitoring keys are set, AA ISA reports all enabled monitoring instances for the subscriber.
Note— The usage_report event must be set by the PCRF, otherwise AA ISA will not report usage-monitoring when a threshold is crossed.
Table 13 illustrates a policer's hardware rate steps for AA ISA:
In Figure 23, Application Assurance policers are applied after ingress SAP policers. Configuration of the SAP ingress policers can be set to disable ingress policing or to set PIR/CIR values such that AA ISA ingress PIR/CIR will be invoked first. This enables application aware discard decisions, ingress policing at SAP ingress is application blind. However, this is a design/implementation guideline that is not enforced by the node.
In the to-aa-sub direction (Figure 24), traffic hits the AA ISA policers before the SAP egress queuing and scheduling. This allows application aware flow, AA subscriber and node traffic policies to be implemented before the Internet traffic is mixed with the other services at node egress. Note that AA ISA policers may remark out-of-profile traffic which allows preferential discard at an IOM egress congestion point only upon congestion.
AA ISA provides full customer control to configure an AQP action that redirects traffic that matches the AQP match criteria (Figure 26). Hence, the HTTP redirect service can applied at any level (application, application group, specific subscribers, specific source IP addresses) or any other AQP match criteria.
A high level packet flow diagram of the solution is shown in Figure 27. The AA ISA is the ICAP client and performs inline L7 packet processing functions while the ICAP application server is used for URL filtering offline, thus the application server does not need to be inserted in the data flow:
In Figure 28, the operator configures the AA ISA to insert the subscriber ID into the HTTP header for all the HTTP traffic destined to the operator portal (designated by server IP and/or HTTP host name). Traffic going to other destinations, such as yahoo.com, does not get enriched. To support this, AA introduces a new AQP action called
HTTP_enrich that allows the operator to enrich traffic that satisfies the AQP-matching conditions.
Figure 30 depicts an example of application mirroring to a specialized offline appliance for further processing.
AA FW can provide up to 128 virtual/partitioned FWs, each with its own FW policies. This is achieved through the use of AA-Partitions. Different VPNs can have different FW policies/rules.
AA ISA AQPs are enhanced with few new AQP actions that provide session filtering functionality. As is the case of AQPs, these have partition level scope. This allows different FW polices to be implemented by utilizing AA partitions concepts within the same AA ISA group. Hence, multiple virtual AA FW instances can be realized. There is no need for multiple physical instances of FWs to implement different FW policies.
The AA FW stateful session filter consists of multiple entries (similar to ACLs) with a match and
action per entry. Actions are
deny or
permit. A
deny action results in packets discarded without creating a session /flow context.
match conditions include IP 5 tuples info. An overall default action is also configurable, in case of a no match to any session filter entry.
Note that for AQPs, only drop events are captured in the log. The logs do not capture drops due to flow policers.
Note that once the gtp command is issued for a partition, AA treats traffic with UDP destination port number 2152 as GTP. It applies the different GTP level firewall functions as configured by the operator. However, it does not look beyond the GTP header for further inner L3-L7 packet classifications and actions. For example, Ipfix record for GTP traffic contains the 5 tuples of the GTP-u tunnel (eNB, SGW IPs and port numbers, etc., no TIED).
Note: Extensive GTP header sanity checks (included in Table 14) that are based on different GTP message types are only performed when these GTP messages are permitted by the GTP filter. If no GTP filter is configured, then no extensive GTP-U header checks are performed. In other words, if the operator wants to allow all GTP-U packets and perform all GTP header sanity checks, then the operator needs to configure a GTP filter with default action of
permit and no values, such as:
To enter the mode to create or edit policies, the begin keyword must be entered at the prompt. Other editing commands include:
To allow flexible order for policy editing, the policy>commit function cross references policy components to verify, among others: